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Regina v. George, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386; Sigeareak EI-53 v. The Queen,
57 D.L.R. (2d) 536.
REGULATORY OFFENCES - GAMVIE LAWS - WHETHER APPLICABLE TO
INDIANS AND ESKIMOS - SECTION 87 OF THE INDIAN ACT - ABORIG-
INAL RIGHTS UNDER TREATIES AND UNDER THE PROCLAMATION OF 1763.
THEREFORE, THE PROMISES WE HAVE MADE TO YOU ARE NOT FOR TODAY ONLY
BUT FOR TOMORROW, NOT ONLY FOR YOU BUT FOR YOUR CHILDREN, BORN AND
UNBORN, AND THE PROMISES WE MAKE WILL BE CARRIED OUT AS LONG AS THE
SUN SHINES ABOVE AND THE WATER FLOWS IN THE OCEAN. (From a speech
by Lieutenant-Governor Morris to the Indians during the negotiation of
the Qu'Appele treaty.')
Two recent Supreme Court of Canada judgments have brought
a settlement to the hitherto much disputed question of the hunting
rights of Canada's aboriginal peoples. Although the cases centred
around the enforcement of game laws, the implications of the decisions
are more far reaching. Taken together with the recent Supreme Court
decision in Regina v. Sikyea2 these cases represent a definitive state-
ment on the present status of Indians and Eskimos in Canadian society.
In Regina v. George the accused was a Chippewa Indian and a
registered member of his band under the Indian Act. He was charged
with shooting two ducks out of season contrary to the provisions of
the federal Migratory Birds Convention Act. The alleged offence took
place on the Chippewa's Kettle Point reserve in western Ontario and
the birds were shot for food and not for sale. Sigeareak E1-53 was an
Eskimo living on the shores of Hudson's Bay within the Northwest
Territories. He was charged with abandoning substantial parts of car-
casses of three barren ground caribou, 3 contrary to the provisions of
the Game Ordinances of the Northwest Territories (which prohibited
abandonment of meat fit for human consumption).4 In neither case
was there substantial dispute on the facts.
George's defence was that the Migratory Birds Convention Act
did not apply to him as an Indian hunting for food on his own reserve.
Central to his argument was section 87 of the Indian Act:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other act of the Parliament
of Canada, all laws of general application from time to time in force in
any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province.
George claimed that he was given a right to hunt for food by the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 and by his tribe's 1827 treaty with the
1 See Regina v. Sik yea, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, at 155.
2 Regina v. Sikyea, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 80.
3 In fact fifteen caribou had been slaughtered and left to rot with little
or no meat taken. Sigeareak could, however, be fixed with the death of only
three. (I am indebted for this information to M. M. DeWeerdt, Esq., of Yellow-
knife, who sent me copies of the trial and appeal proceedings).
4 It might be noted that it is generally not difficult to preserve fresh meat
in the north. Meat can be buried in the permafrost or, more conveniently
(and this is a common native practice during the summer months), immersed
in a cold stream or lake. In either case, it will remain edible for months.
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Crown. He said that these rights superceded and in the circumstances
supplanted the Act.
This defence succeeded in the Magistrate's Court, in the High
Court of Ontarios and, by a majority, in the Court of Appeal. Roach
J.A. summed up the majority view in this way . . .
The Migratory Birds Convention Act is an Act of general application In
this and other provinces but by virtue of s. 87 it is subject to the terms of
any treaty.6.
The application of the Migratory Birds Convention Act to Indians
in the Northwest Territories was being tested almost contemporan-
eously7 in Regina v. Sikyea.8 Sikyea, an Indian under treaty and hunt-
ing for food, was charged with shooting two Mallard ducks out of
season. He was convicted by a Police Magistrate but his appeal to
Sissons J. was allowed, the learned judge holding that the Game
Ordinances of the territories made pursuant to the Act were not
applicable to Indians and Eskimos. The Territorial Court of Appeal
reluctantly concluded that the legislation was valid and broad enough
to limit native rights and restored the conviction. An appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed just after the Ontario Court
of Appeal's decision in George was handed down.
When Regina v. George came before the Supreme Court of Can-
ada Cartwright J., dissenting, suggested that since the decision in
Sikyea had been arrived at without a consideration of section 87 of
the Indian Act it should be held to be per incuriam.9 Cartwright J.
favoured George's claim for exemption from the restrictions of the
Act.
To determine whether any particular law is applicable to an Indian In
Ontario only two questions need be answered, (i) is it a law of general
application, (ii) is it in force in the province? If the answer to both of
these questions is in the affirmative the source of the law is of no import-
ance. In my opinion the Migratory Birds Convention Act is a law of
general application in force in Ontario and applicable to the respondent
but by s. 87 its application to him is made subject to the terms of the
treaty of July 10, 1827.10
The majority of the court" concurred in the judgment of Mart-
land J. who decided the case solely on the basis of a construction of
section 87. In his words . . .
5 McRuer C.J.H.C. stated... "The Indian's rights to hunt for food on the
lands reserved to them in the treaty of 1827 cannot now be taken away by
the Parliament of Canada short of legislation which expressly and directly
extinguishes those rights." 41 D.L.R. (2d) 31 at 36.
6 The Attorney General of Canada v. George, 45 D.L.R. (2d) 709, at 711.
Gibson J.A. dissented, principally on the question of whether the 1827
treaty did in fact reserve hunting rights. He held that it did not.
7 Sikyea's offence was committed on May 7, 1962, George's on September
5, 1962.
8 Regina v. Silcyea, 40 W.W.R. 494 (Territorial Court), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150
(Territorial Court of Appeal), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 80 (Supreme Court of Canada).
9 Regina v. George, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386, at 396.
10 Ibid. at 390-391.
11 Fauteux, Abbott, Judson, Ritchie and Hall JJ. concurring.
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In my opinion it was not the purpose of s. 87 to make any legislation of
the Parliament of Canada subject to the terms of any treaty.12
This section was not intended to be a declaration of the paramountcy of
treaties over federal legislation. The reference to treaties was incorpor-
ated in a section the purpose of which was to make provincial laws applic-
able to the Indians, so as to preclude any interference with rights under
treaties resulting from the impact of provincial legislation.13
Sigeareak's defence was, in substance, the same as that of George,
even though he had no treaty to protect him. He was charged under
an Ordinance passed by the Commissioner in Council of the Northwest
Territories. The Ordinance was pursuant to the Federal Northwest
Territories Act which, by a 1960 amendment, specifically empowered
the Commissioner in Council to make regulations "in relation to the
preservation of game in the territories" which would be "applicable
to and in respect of Indians and Eskimos". The amendment added the
proviso that "nothing... shall be construed as authorizing the Com-
missioner in Council to make Ordinances restricting or prohibiting
Indians or Eskimos from hunting for food on unoccupied Crown lands
game other than game declared by the Governor in Council to be game
in danger of becoming extinct". In 1960 the Governor General declared
barren ground caribou to be in danger of becoming extinct.14
Sissons J. had previously ruled in Kalooar vi. Reginam's and
Regina v. Kogogoak16 (neither of which decisions had been appealed)
that the Eskimos in the Territories could claim rights under the
Proclamation of 1763 just as the Indians did and that these rights
could be abrogated only by specific acts of the Federal Parliament.
in his view the Commissioner in Council was not competent to limit
Indian rights even when acting pursuant to federal legislation.
The Game Ordinance of the Northwest Territories cannot and does not
apply to the Eskimos. 17
The Police Magistrate before whom Sigeareak initially appeared held
himself bound by Kallooar and dismissed the charge. The Crown
appeal to Sissons J. was, not surprisingly, unsuccessful. 18 The Court
of Appeal of the Northwest Territories took the opposite view. The
Proclamation of 1763 did not, on its face, apply to the lands held at
that time by the Hudson's Bay Company, and the court could not sup-
12 Regina v. George, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386, at 397.
13 Ibid., 398.
14 See generally, Sigereak B1-53 v. The Queen, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 536, at 540-
541. The actual state of the barren ground caribou population is a matter
of some dispute. Estimates of their numbers range from 200,000 to 700,000.
N.W.T. councililor for the Western Arctic Duncan Pryde reported seeing a
herd of caribou that took nine continuous days to pass Bathurst Inlet in May
1966. [See The Norther (Fort Smith) vol. 5, #5, December 12, 66]. Sissons J.
in discussing the 1960 order in council in Regina v. Sikyea said "This [the
declaration that caribou are in danger of becoming extinct] may be fact or
fiction, and may well be fiction." Regina v. Sikyea, 40 W.W.R. 494, at 502.
Is Kallooar v. Regina, 50 W.W.R. 602.
16 Regina v. Kogogolak, 28 W.W.R. 376. See also Regina v. Koonungnak,
45 W.W.R. 283; Regina v. Otokiak, 28 W.W.R. 515.
17 Regina v. KogogoZak, 28 W.W.R. 376, at 384.
18 The judgment of Sissons J. is unreported.
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port the general extension of its rights to all Eskimos regardless of
geographic location that was advocated by Sissons J. The Court of
Appeal further held that the Ordinance, validly made under the powers
given to the Commissioner in Council by the Northwest Territories
Act, was competent to bind Eskimos and that Sigeareak was guilty
as charged. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the appeal decision
on both grounds and specifically overruled Kallooar and Kogogolak.19
In these decisions, then, the court has affirmed the right of the
Federal Parliament not only to legislate for Indians and Eskimos, but
also to render these peoples subject to the general legislation regard-
less of any previous undertakings that such legislation may abrogate.
In effect, after George and Sigearea, Indians and Eskimos are just
another minority among the citizens of Canada.
11
THE COURT IS ENTITLED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF TIM FACTS OF HISTORY
WMTBER PAST OR CONTEOROUS... AND IT IS ENTITLED TO RELY ON ITS
OWN HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE AND RESEARCHES.20
Native rights are best assessed, and most often upheld by courts,
after an analysis of their historic foundations.
The Proclamation of 1763
For reasons which will become apparent it is best to begin with
the assumption that native hunting rights have always existed and
were simply recognized, not created, by the Proclamation and the
various treaties. Norris J.A. concluded in Regina v. White and Bob
"That aboriginal hunting rights existed in favour of the Indian from
time immemorial". 21 In Kogogolac Sissons J. stated "The hunting
rights of the Eskimos existed at all times".2  The significance of this
approach can be seen when it is realized that the Proclamation (called
the "Charter of Indian Rights" and "the Magna Carta of the Eskimos"
by Sissons J.)23 is lamentably inexplicit as to what rights it allows to
natives. The operative clause in this respect is . . .
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and
the security of our Colonies, that the several nations or Tribes of Indians
with whom we are connected, and who live under our Protection, should
not be molested or disturbed in Possession of such Parts of our Dominions
and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by us, are
reserved to them or any of them as their Hunting Grounds .... 24
Just what reservation as "Hunting Grounds" entailed is unclear,
but courts, including the Ontario Court of Appeal in the George
decision, seem to have adopted the view that restrictions on the right
19 igeareak E1-53 v. The Queen, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 536, at 542.
20 Regina v. White and Bob, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, at 629 per Norris J.A.
This case contains a recent and exhaustive study of Indian rights in British
Columbia.
21 Ibid., at 663.
22 Regina v. Kogogoak, 28 W.W.R. 376, at 378.
23 Ibid., at 378.
24 R.S.C. 1952, vol. VI, 6130.
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to take game were outside of anyone's contemplation two centuries
ago.25
The Proclamation has a further and perhaps more serious weak-
ness. By its own terms the "Hunting Grounds" were reserved outside
of the land held by the Hudson's Bay Company and beyond the region
of the "Quebec" government that the Proclamation created. The
rather casual manner in which continents were divided up in the
early Colonial era renders the Proclamation's present day application
rather vague.2 6 Furthermore, is all of the continent west of the
Hudson's Bay Company and Quebec lands to be considered subject
to the "Hunting Grounds" reservation or just that part known and
explored at the time the Proclamation was made? 27 Of course Indians
in eastern and maritime Canada cannot rely on the Proclamation as
a foundation for any claim of right.28 Sissons J., as was mentioned
earlier, preferred to look on the Proclamation as a general statement
of rights rather than a geographic division of Colonial administration.
In Kogogolak he said . . .
I do not think it matters if this was Hudson's Bay Company land. The
hunting rights of the Eskimos existed at all times. The Hudson's Bay
Company always respected these rights.29
I think the Royal Proclamation of 1763 is still in full force and effect as
to the lands of the Eskimos.30
The Supreme Court rejected this view decisively in Sigeareak.31
The Proclamation has been held to have the force of a statute.
McRuer C.J.H.C., in his decision on George, quoted and approved of
these words in The King v. Lady McMaster:
The proclamation of 1763... has the force of a statute, and so far therein
as rights of the Indians are concerned, it has never been repealed.32
25 A-G Canada v. George, 45 D.L.R. (2d) 709, at pp. 712-713. c.f. Regina v.
White and Bob, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, at 647.
26 The western border of the 1763 Quebec ran in a line from the south end
of Lake Nipissim [sic] "crossing the river St. Lawrence, and the Lake Cham-
plain, in 45 Degrees of North Latitude, passes along the High Lands which
divide the Rivers that empty themselves into the said River St. Lawrence
from those which fall into the sea." R.S.C. 1952, Vol. VI, p. 6127. The Hudson's
Bay Company had roughly all the land drained by Hudson's Bay.
27 Norris J.A. in Reginav . White and Bob suggested that the Proclama-
tion would apply to all western lands on the basis of England's claim to such
lands (50 D.L.R. (2d) at 644 and he held specifically that it applied to Van-
couver Island (at 664). On the other hand, the Court of Appeal in Regina v.
Sikyea doubted that the Proclamation could apply to Indians living in the
western part of the Northwest Territories since that area was "terra incog-
nita" in 1763 (43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, at 152).
28 Rex v. SyZiboy, [1929] 1 D.LR. 307.
29 Regina v. Kogogolak, 28 W.W.R. 376, at 378.
30 Ibid., 383.
31 "The Proclamation specifically excludes territory granted to the Hud-
son's Bay Company and there can be no question that the region in question
was within the area granted to Hudson's Bay Company. Accordingly the
Proclamation does not and never did apply in the region in question and the
judgments to the contrary are not good law." Sigeareak v. The Queen, 57
D.L.R. (2d) 536, at 570.
32 The King v. Lady McMaster, [1926] Ex. C.R. 68, at 72. See McRuer
C.J.H.C. in 41 D.L.R. (2d) at 35-36. The provisions of the Proclamation given
effect to in this case were those against the sale of Indian lands to private
individuals and had nothing to do with game rights.
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Gibson J.A., however, in his dissenting judgment in George, in
the Court of Appeal, gave tacit approval to the Crown's submission
that if the Proclamation was a statute it was, since the Statute of
Westminster, subject to amendment or repeal by legislation of the
federal Parliament.3 3 The Supreme Court having been silent on the
question this latter view seems to have prevailed.
The Treaties
One of the provisions of the Proclamation was that the lands
reserved to the Indians could be sold only to the Crown.34 It was as
a result of these sales that the Indians obtained their treaties. Just
what was being sold was for a time a vexed point but around the
turn of the century the Privy Council ruled that in ceding lands to
the Crown the Indians were releasing a "substantial and paramount
estate" already vested in the Crown from its "overlying Indian inter-
est".35 In return for this release of interest there was usually a pay-
ment to the tribe in one form or another and, in many treaties,
(especially the later ones) a guarantee of hunting rights. The stan-
dard clause on this matter ran as follows . . .
And Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees with her said Indians, that
they shall have right to pursue their vocation of hunting throughout the
tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such regulation as
may from time to time be made by the government of the country acting
under the authority of Her Majesty.3 6
33 A-G Can. v. George, 45 D.L.R. (2d) 709, at 717.
34 Such sale could only be a public meeting of the band. R.S.C. 1952, Vol.
VI, 6131. In what capacity did the Indians treat? Chief Joseph Brank liked to
maintain that the Indians were allies, not subjects, of the Crown. John Bever-
ley Robinson, while Attorney General for Upper Canada, and Riddel J., one
hundred years later, both ridiculed this idea. (See Sero v. Gault, 64 D.L.R. 327,
at 330). Indians in the United States, however, generally did sign treaties as
nations.
"Implicit in the negotiation of treaties, which during the early history of
the country were entered into with nearly every tribe within the United
States, was the notion that the tribes were sovereign. The use of treaties
rather than statutes created an international rather than national rela-
tionship. Moreover, the subject matter of the treaties, i.e. was powers,
boundary and frontier regulations, and extradition contributed to this
notion." In Clinger, W. F. Jr., The Constitutional Rights of The American
Tribal Indian. (1965) 51 VA. L. Rnv. 121, at 126.
35 In St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, (1839) 14 A.C.
46 the Privy Council commented on this matter, at 54-55.
"The tenure of the Indians was a personal and usufructary right, depend-
ent upon the goodwill of the Sovereign. The lands reserved are expressly
stated to be "parts of our Dominions and territories", and it is to be
declared the will and pleasure of the Sovereign that "for the present"
they shall be preserved for the use of the Indians as their hunting grounds
under His protection and dominion.... It appears to [their Lordships]
... that there has been all along vested in the Crown a substantial and
paramount estate, underlying the Indian title, which became a plenum
dominion whenever that title or otherwise extinguished."
This view was employed again twenty years later when, in Dominion of
Canada v. Province of Ontario [1910] A.C. 637, Lord Loreburn spoke of land
gained from the Indians by treaty as having been "released from the over-
lying Indian interest".
36 Rex v. Wesley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337, at 350. See also Regina v. Sikyea,
40 W.W.R. 494, at 500.
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These rights applied to the land ceded: the rights on the lands
reserved should, presumably, be even more extensive, if not absolute.
It was just such a presumption that allowed some treaties, such as the
one in George to be completely silent on the matter of game rights.37
This deficiency in terms led Cartwright J. to say . . .
I find it impossible to suppose that any of the signatories to the treaty
would have understood that what was reserved to the Indians and their
posterity was the right merely to occupy the reserved lands and not the
right to hunt and fish thereon which they had enjoyed from time imme-
morial.38
The treaties then, like the Proclamation, have often afforded
protection that is more apparent than real. Cases in which an Indian
has succeeded in claiming rights on the basis of a treaty alone, un-
supported by the Proclamation or by statute, if they exist at all are
exceedingly rare. When, as in George, treaty rights are not even held
to merit specific mention in the federal legislation that abrogates
them the treaties may well be considered dead letters.
The Role of the Government.
Whether as a cause or effect of the impotence of the Proclama-
tion and the treaties, the federal government has always been the
dominant force in the determination of aboriginal rights. Under sec-
tion 91(24) of the British North America Act, "Indians and lands
reserved for Indians" are under the exclusive control of the Federal
Government. Though the extent of this jurisdiction has been disputed,
numerous cases3 9 have held that only federal legislation or provincial
regulations made pursuant to federal legislation 4° are competent to
limit such rights as natives may claim. Aside from such claims, sec-
tion 87 of the Indian Act (quoted supra) makes laws of general appli-
cation in the province applicable to Indians.
37 The Kettle Point Reservation treaty was, in effect, a bill of sale which
transferred 2,200,000 acres to the Government for an annuity of £11,000
saving, nevertheless, and expressly reserving to the said nations of Indians
and their posterity at all times hereafter for their own exclusive use and
enjoyment about 23,000 acres. See Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders,
1680-1890. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1891.
Provisional Surrender Treaty #27A, p. 65.
Confirmatory Surrender Treaty #29, p. 71.
Quotation is from page 72.
38 Regina v. George, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386, at 389. Even where explicit a
treaty may not be inviolable. A 1752 treaty with the Mick Mack Indians of
Nova Scotia held that the tribe "shall have free liberty of hunting and fishing
as usual". In 1958 a claimant to the treaty rights and a member of the Micmac
tribe lost his case when the court asked him to prove decent "by blood or
otherwise" from the Indians with whom the treaty had been signed. See
Regina v. Simon, 124 C.C.C. 110. (This test is the result of a perhaps un-
warranted extention of the ratio of Rex v. Syliboy, [1929) 1 D.L.R. 307.)
39 The latest and most authoritative decision on this point is Regina v.
White and Bob, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 618. An appeal on this decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada was dismissed in 52 D.L.R. 2d 481. See also Rex v. Wesley,
[1932] 2 W.W.R. 337; Rex v. Jim, 26 C.C.C. 236; Rex v. Hiil, [1951] O.W.N. 824.
Regina v. Otokiak, 28 W.W.R. 515. Lysyk K., Indian Hunting Rights: Con-
stitutional Consideration and the Role of Indian Treaties in British Columbia,
(1966) 2 U.B.C.L. REv. 401.
40 Sero v. Gault, 64 D.L.R. 327.
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Federal regulation of Indian affairs has always been allowed,
(indeed most treaties made provision for it), but until the decisions
in Sigearealk and George the question remained unsettled as to the
breadth and form that such regulations could or should take. In
George, McRuer C.J.H.C. suggested that, although the federal govern-
ment had the power to take away Indian rights without regard to trea-
ties, to do so would be "a breach of our national honour". 41 In Regina
v. Sikyea the Territorial Court of Appeal concluded that the govern-
ment had done just what McRuer had feared it could do, and called
the action "a breach of faith [with the Indians] on the part of the
government".42
Those decisions that defended Indian rights generally held that
though the government could take such rights away, it could do so
only by means of specific legislation which made unequivocal refer-
ence to those rights. This was the position taken by McRuer C.J.H.C.
in George as well as by Sissons J. in Sikyea.
Eskimo rights could be extinguished by the Parliament of Canada. How-
ever, vested rights are not to be taken away without express words as
necessary intendment or implication.4 3
The Supreme Court evidently thought differently.
The Eskimos
The legal position of the Eskimos is different from that of the
Indians. In 1939 the Supreme Court reference Re Eskimos" decided
that exclusive legislative jurisdiction over Eskimos fell to the Federal
Government under section 91 (24) of the British North America Act.
Section 4(1) of the Indian Act, however, denies that act any applica-
tion to Eskimos and as yet no comparable and exclusively Eskimo
legislation has been drafted. As is seen in Sigeareak, the application
of the proclamation of 1763 to Eskimos is at best problematical.
Furthermore, with the exception of some bands in Labrador, the
Eskimos have no treaties with the Crown. Sissons J. has argued that
as a consequence of this Eskimo aboriginal rights continue to exist
in full force and that Eskimos without treaties are in a stronger
position than Indians with them.45 The Carrothers commission, how-
41 Regina v. George, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 31, at 37.
42 Regina v. Sikyea, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, at 158. The court gave effect to the
treaty abrogating regulations with great and evident reluctance and suggested
that it was a case of "the left hand having forgotten what the right hand
had done" (at 158).
43 Regina v. ,Sikyea, 40 W.W.R. 494, at 503. See the words of McRuer
C.J.H.C. to the same effect quoted in footnote 4. This would seem to be the
legal position of the American Indian.
Tribal Indians are subject to state law to only a limited degree since,
in the absence of congressional authorization, state courts have neither
criminal nor civil jurisdiction over the activities of tribal Indians on
reservations. Moreover, with certain exceptions, tribal Indians are
subject to federal law only to the extent that it specifically applies to
them. Clinger, W.F. Jr. Op Cit., footnote 34, at p. 122.
44 Re Eskimos, [1939) 2 D.L.R. 417.




ever, in its recent study of northern problems, came to a different
conclusion.
The rights of the Eskimos with whom no treaty has been signed... are
those of Canadian citizens.4 6
This view may be less useful to the Eskimos than that of Sissons
J. but in the light of the decision in Sigeareak it is perhaps the more
accurate of the two.
I
There is no easy conclusion to be reached on the validity of these
decisions. The George and Sigereak judgments can be examined from
both a judicial and a social point of view and advantages and dis-
advantages present themselves in either aspect.
Judicially speaking, the prevailing view in the Supreme Court
seems to have been that the matter was purely one of statutory inter-
pretation. Did or did not the Proclamation of 1763 apply: how is
section 87 of the Indian Act to be construed? The conclusions arrived
at on these questions were in many ways determined by the assump-
tions begun with. It seems to have been taken for granted by the
majority of judges that Parliament could legislate to the derogation
of what had been assumed to be native rights. The question that these
judges asked themselves, was whether Parliament had done so in
these particular circumstances. Implicit in this approach to the prob-
lem is the assumption that native rights are, or were, an extraordinary
and perhaps archaic privilege which aboriginal peoples should be
taught to outgrow. The statutory interpretations agreed upon-i.e.
that the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the Game Ordinances
of the Northwest Territories were competent to bind native peoples
as well as other Canadians-are justifiable when founded on these
premises.
It is well to remember, however, that another judicial approach
is possible. Cartwright, McRuer and Sissions J.J., among others, can be
taken to have begun with the assumption that the aboriginal peoples of
Canada had been accorded distinct and substantive rights by the men
and governments to whom they ceded their lands. To these learned
judges the Proclamation of 1763 and the various treaties were under-
takings binding in honour; promises of a scope that would be sub-
verted by an overly nice interpretation of their fine print. This view
does not deny Parliament's right to vary, or even end, unilaterally
these rights, but it does demand that such changes be made expressly,
with unequivocal intention and clear contemplation of the covenants
to be struck down.
The social and practical consequences of these decisions are
equally ambiguous. The legislation in question was intended primarily
for the preservation of game and it is obvious that no Canadians have
46 CAR oTHERS, A.W.R., REPORT OF THE ADVISpRY Co1misSIoN ON THE DE-
VELOP MNT OF GovENENT IN Tn NORTHWEST TEmaoRis (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1966), 63.
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more to gain from an intelligent conservation policy than Indians and
Eskimos. It is worth noting that the Sigeareak prosecution was begun
on the complaint of another Eskimo who disapproved of the pointless
caribou slaughter. Moreover the Crown's appeal to the Territorial
Court of Appeal was argued on the ground, inter alia, that only by
strict enforcement of the conservation laws with respect to caribou
could Eskimos be saved from a disastrous famine such as the one
which overtook the plains Indians a century ago after the buffalo
herds had been decimated. 47
On the other hand, however, is it wise to legislate for Indians and
Eskimos in the same terms (or with only minor exemptions and varia-
tions) as for all other citizens? These native peoples form a very
distinct element in Canadian society and for the most part live under
quite unusual conditions. The precise nature of their unique status
is as difficult to define as it is impossible to deny, but historically and
culturally they are more than simply an ethnic minority.
The Eskimos to this day gain much of their food by hunting and
fishing; should not special laws recognize the right to take game as
a fundamental element in their existence and not as simply a privilege
to be bestowed or denied by their white administrators?
Indians in the more southerly parts of Canada are generally less
dependent on game, but they have a different claim for special con-
sideration. Indians on reservations are under the "protection" of the
Indian Act. As a corollary to this protected status, a treaty Indian is
denied many of the normal rights and duties of citizenship. 48 When
this paternalistic policy is unredeemed by any vestige of his ancient
rights and status the treaty Indian becomes for all purposes a second
class citizen, severed from his past and barred from an effective
participation in the present.
In the concluding passages of its report the Carrothers com-
mission made this comment:
The vital question [is] whether the indigenous peoples should be subject
to the same laws as the white population, particularly the criminal law.
Is there a fundamental difference in the value systems of the indigenous
peoples from the values that have shaped the white man's law so as to
justify two legal systems, and is it feasible or politically acceptable that
there be two sets of laws?49
47 I am indebted to M. M. DeWeerdt, Esq., of Yellowknife, for this
information.
48 The Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149. For example: Land on the reserve
is not owned by individuals in the usual sense and cannot be sold or mortgaged
to other than an Indian without the special permission of the Minister (Sec.
20, 37, 88, 89).
Indians are subject to special provisions with respect to wills. Sec. 45
et. seq. The notorious "Indian Laws" regarding liquor are found in sections
93, 94, 95, 96. Indians are eligible for a number of special payments from the
government (Section 15, 61 et. seq.), can get special government loans (Sec.
69), and are normally not subject to property taxes (Sec. 82, 86).
49 Tnm CAPuo=Rs CommissIox, supra, note 46, 201. The Commission
suggested that the answer .to this question was in the negative and that two
systems of substantive law would be unworkable and a bad precedent for
other ethnic groups.
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If the legislation here considered and interpreted represents an
honest grappling with this question and a conscious and informed
statement on the nature of aboriginal rights, there is little complaint
to be made. If, as seems more likely, it is through ignorance or in-
advertence that these laws have broken some very old promises, the
court might better have served its function by calling on the legis-
lators for a more precise definition of their intentions. If, as Cart-
wright, McRuer and Sissons JJ. seemed to believe, the court's duty
to interpret legislation includes the power to shape ambiguous legis-
lation to the contours of social justice, perhaps the assumptions that
those learned judges brought to the question of native rights were the
preferable ones.
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